After a period marked by a series of tactical withdrawals, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party has dug in and declared - there’s no turning back. A few hours after another attempt to find the lowest common denominator on which all political actors could agree failed due to the government’s refusal to merge the Belgrade and local elections, the President of the Assembly Ana Brnabić scheduled the Belgrade elections on 2 June. And while the government continues to extend one hand to the opposition, claiming that it seeks compromise, with the other, it is already gearing up for pre-election activities, assuming that they ever took a break.
28.03.
2024.
They managed to unite on a joint opposition list called ‘Serbia Against Violence’ before the elections on 17 December.
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2024.
Now the question arises, what is the essence of the next phase of Ana Brnabić's political career.
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2024.
Traces leading to Vučević to this position have been visible for years.
This turn of events has forced the opposition to resort to an already used method of political struggle. For nearly four years, the word “boycott” was forbidden in speeches of opposition leaders. Only recently, after allegations of electoral fraud and a European Parliament resolution that lent them international legitimacy, the term began to resurface. At first timidly, as one of the options if nothing else produces results. However, as time went by, the term boycott, clothed in euphemisms such as “active resistance” and “civil disobedience”, has been uttered more and more loudly. Now, with Ana Brnabić announcing the elections and the coalition around the Serbian Progressive Party launching its campaign, some opposition representatives are discussing boycott as a likely scenario.
Political analyst Đorđe Vukadinović believes that, given the existing conditions, a boycott is justified.
“It’s a reasonable move considering that nothing has been done to address the electoral irregularities noted by both international observers and domestic participants. So far, the authorities have practically done nothing to improve the conditions, and there simply isn’t enough time until 2 June for what they’ve announced. In that sense, I understand the opposition’s decision to boycott, even though it comes with its own risks and dilemmas,” emphasizes Vukadinović.
The risks that a boycott entails for opposition representatives should not be unknown. Most of those currently in coalitions such as “Serbia Against Violence” and “NADA” (National Democratic Alternative) decided to take this step back in 2020. The result was a practically one-party composition of the National Assembly, which, among other things, managed to amend Constitution of Serbia with a two-thirds majority. During that time, opposition parties were left without budget financing, and media outlets with national coverage had convincing justifications for not inviting them to their programs. However, it should be noted that boycotting at the national and local levels is not the same and has different benefits and consequences for both those boycotting and those against whom the boycott is directed.
Nevertheless, Đorđe Vukadinović wouldn’t label the boycott of four years ago as a failure.
“The boycott may have failed to live up to high expectations and announcements, but I wouldn’t say it was entirely unsuccessful. After that, the ruling party obtained a parliament that it was slightly ashamed of, and Aleksandar Vučić immediately limited its term of office. If it weren’t for the ‘Trojan horses’ that Vučić lured in by lowering the census just before the elections, the boycott would have been even more successful,” notes Vukadinović.
This time, things are different. The opposition representatives managed to secure a total of 78 parliamentary seats in the December parliamentary elections, which also means an uninterrupted flow of funds necessary for daily party functioning. In addition, the international circumstances are also significantly different. In 2020, Serbia’s electoral situation didn’t arouse much interest beyond its borders. In world capitals, there was still considerable understanding for Vučić’s policy of sitting in two chairs as long as he demonstrated cooperation regarding the Kosovo issue. However, with the onset of the war in Ukraine, Vučić’s two chairs have diverged significantly, leading to a reevaluation of the previous stabilitocracy doctrine personified by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. As a result of this, but also due to the fact that the pro-European opposition united and launched a diplomatic offensive, a very harsh Resolution was passed by the European Parliament, which called for an international investigation into allegations of electoral fraud. Following the resolution, the ODIHR also published its report, where, in carefully chosen words, it also recognized numerous deficiencies in the electoral system.
TANJUG / RADE PRELIĆ
Under the international spotlight, the ruling party has behaved in an unusually constructive manner after the December elections. First, they abandoned the formation of the Belgrade government, raising their own “legitimacy ladder,” even though they could have secured the required number of councilors. Then they gave up on scheduling the elections for 28 April, even though that timing would have suited them due to reduced voter turnout. Finally, they agreed to offer the opposition, at least in theory, discussions on the formation of a commission to revise the electoral register and open up the RTS (Radio Television of Serbia).
According to Dragan Popović, the director of the Centre for Practical Politics, this series of small victories could serve as a good springboard for the opposition in their campaign.
“In my opinion, a much easier path for the opposition would be to convey to their voters the message that they are on a winning path, riding the wave of these successes. With that message, they could enter the campaign and, avoiding government’s spin, address topics that truly matter to the citizens of Belgrade – such as the wheels that are killing people and the undeniable fact that the city is literally falling apart,” emphasizes Popović.
“Regardless of the path the opposition decides to take, the crucial thing is how they will communicate that decision to their voters,” he added.
“First, they need to agree among themselves on what they truly want and what the consequences of that decision are. Only once they have established that, they must unveil a clear plan to their voters, as well as all other citizens. A boycott must be well thought out and effectively communicated; it’s not enough to merely call for abstaining from elections. For now, the announcement of a boycott seems ad hoc to me, as if individuals from larger coalition parties are trying to force it upon others. If citizens gain the impression that it’s not a unified stance or that it was made under some form of pressure, it will cause a much bigger problem for the opposition,” notes Popović.
If the opposition opts for a boycott, another challenge for the opposition could be the fact that regular local elections in two-thirds of municipalities and cities in the country immediately follow the Belgrade elections. Judging by the December results, the opposition would have a good chance of winning in some of these municipalities and cities, especially in central Belgrade municipalities, Novi Sad, and Niš. The thesis that has been circulating in public recently is that boycotting the Belgrade elections would inevitably lead the opposition to boycott the local ones, leaving the ruling Serbian Progressive Party untouched.
Đorđe Vukadinović is convinced that this is yet another government spin, and there is nothing compelling the opposition to boycott the local elections.
“Boycotting one doesn’t necessarily mean boycotting the other. Finally, no one from the opposition has even mentioned the possibility of boycotting the local elections. They will undoubtedly face an even greater dilemma before the local elections, but those shouldn’t be expected before autumn. Until then, there is plenty of time to implement part of the recommendations and change the electoral conditions. The opposition would be in a much tighter spot if the ruling party had been more cunning and agreed to merge the local and Belgrade elections. Then they would find themselves in a much greater dilemma about whether to boycott the elections,” says Vukadinović.
While the opposition is still considering how to position themselves in response to the government’s refusal to make any significant concessions, the ruling party has already launched its campaign. In their usual manner, they were the first to submit signatures to the City Election Commission, announcing the start of the pre-election campaign focused on national issues. The title “Aleksandar Vučić – Belgrade Tomorrow” clearly indicates who will lead the campaign, and the personalities who attended the presentation of signatures – representatives of the Oathkeepers (Zavetnici) party, radicals, and traditional coalition partners of the Progressives – outline the main features of the announced People’s Movement. While the Progressive pre-election machinery is heating up, an invitation has arrived from Ana Brnabić for another meeting with the opposition.
TANJUG / STR (STR)
“Theoretically, there is still room for agreement, but in practice, very little,” says Vukadinović.
“I think this is an attempt by the authorities to present themselves as the constructive side offering compromise. But realistically, the chances for a compromise are minimal. After all, they submitted their list, so I don’t know what compromise we’re really talking about,” concludes Vukadinović, adding that a boycott by the opposition would lead to further polarization and radicalization of the political scene.
The latest episode of the post-election drama took place in the National Assembly, where in two separate meetings the two sides tried to find the lowest common denominator that would guarantee some kind of legitimacy of the upcoming elections. The debate was held behind closed doors, without cameras, which is a prerequisite for any meaningful political debate in Serbia. As expected, the two sides failed to reach agreement.
Although they claim otherwise, no one was enthusiastic about meetings and compromises. On the one hand, the authorities have no interest in changing the electoral system. After all, media control and a range of electoral manipulations did not arise spontaneously. They have worked on it for years, in a dedicated and systematic manner. The opposition knows this better than anyone. They have been deceived by the kindness of the authorities several times, from round tables at the Faculty of Political Sciences to the Đilas – Vučić meeting at the Presidency. However, just because the meeting was doomed to fail even before it started doesn’t mean it didn’t serve its purpose. The real battle began the moment the opposition delegation left the meeting, shifting the focus to narrative control. It is not a secret that the meeting was held at the suggestion of Western representatives, who are now observing the situation regarding the elections in Serbia with much more interest than before. Interestingly, we have learned from “well-informed” government circles that Brussels is against a boycott. In such circumstances, both the authorities and the opposition are striving to prove that the other side is responsible for the failure of negotiations.
Every sentence uttered by Brnabić after the second meeting was designed to present the authorities in a constructive light and to portray the opposition as sabotaging the entire process with their unreasonable and illegal requests. Consequently, the authorities readily accepted two requests related to the formation of a commission to oversee the revision of the electoral register and the opening of RTS. They would have accepted a third request regarding the merger of Belgrade and local elections if it were in their power, but “the law is the law.” This kind of argumentation assumes that the Western patrons of the meeting are either disinterested or completely ignorant of the domestic political situation. First, the blank acceptance of two requests carries no weight in itself. The devil is always in the details with such matters. If the Progressives have gained anything from the previous Eurointegration process other than pre-accession funds, it is the skill of adopting seemingly progressive laws and regulations that serve as decorative paper for established practices. The justification for not accepting the third request to merge the elections seems even less convincing. The authorities, which have organized elections for twelve years according to their convenience and preferences, and who amend electoral laws just before the campaign, now invoke Koštunica’s legalistic principle.
TANJUG / Vladimir Sporčić
The position of the coalitions Serbia Against Violence and NADA is even more complex because, in addition to proving to the international community that constructiveness by the Progressives is a mere bluff, they must also keep an eye on their own voters. Because the prerequisite for even thinking about winning the Belgrade elections is that all those who voted for them in December do the same in the repeat elections. Only then can they think about the votes that remained below the threshold and how to prevent electoral manipulation by the SNS. The motivation of the opposition electorate will be even more challenging as the post-election crisis continues. People are tired of elections, and the belief in the possibility of regime change, which was tangible last year, is slowly fading now. Therefore, the opposition urgently needs a significant concession from the authorities—something that can persuade people that it’s worth voting once more. Vučić granted them repeat elections and a two-month campaign, but the opposition requires something that Vučić is unwilling to provide.
